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Comments

FIGURE 1

Millions of animals

Vivisection and Misanthropy
George P. Cave
Part of the aftermath of the Edward
Taub monkey case has been a spate
of articles accusing the antivivisection
movement of misanthropy. The latest example is Walter Goodman's essay, "Of
Mice, Monkeys and Men" (Newsweek,
August 9, 1982). While drawing essentially
the same conclusion as his predecessors,
Goodman opts for a milder version of
the charge. Unlike William Raspberry
("Saving Monkeys, Ignoring People,"
Washington Post, October 14, 1981), who
believes that antivivisectionists care more
about animals than people, and Timothy
Noah ("Monkey Business," The New Republic, June 2, 1982), who believes that
they don't care about people at all, Goodman thinks they care about them more or
less equally, and this, in his view, is "inhuman." He rounds off his essay with
the statement:

Proscribing experiments on animals
may mean prescribing them for people. But, then, carrying humane impulses to an inhuman end is one of
the talents that distinguishes us from
other species.
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To arrive at this conclusion, Goodman
has even taken the trouble to go directly
to a text which is widely regarded, within
the animal rights movement, as one of
the primary sources of animal rights ideology- Peter Singer's Animal Liberation.
Goodman recognizes that it is reasonable to question whether all experiments
performed on animals really contribute
to human welfare, and he even concedes
that the use of animals in laboratories
"could no doubt be reduced further

without harm to humankind." On the
other hand, it is quite clear that he is
completely unaware of the sheer quantity of absolutely worthless experiments
currently being conducted, ,and that he
subscribes to the popular misconception,
deliberately perpetrated by the research
establishment, that animal experimentation is coextensive with biomedical research, thereby contributing directly to
human welfare through the conquering
of disease. Furthermore, Goodman seems
to be largely ignorant of the extent to
which nonanimal alternatives are already
available to the researcher, a fact that
those with a vested economic interest in
perpetuating animal experimentation
naturally play down.
Goodman is also aware that resolving the debate as to whether animal experimentation really benefits humans is
not the end of the matter, ethically
speaking. Unlike most critics of the antivivisection movement, who content
themselves with the dogmatic assertion
that experimentation helps humans and
therefore (by traditional homocentric
valuations), is necessary, he is at least
willing to entertain the question as to
whether "the prospective benefit to humans is sufficient justification." He is
unsatisfied, however, with what he takes
to be the antivisection movement's answer to this question, namely, that an experiment is not justified unless it is done
"for the benefit of the animal involved."
Goodman assumes that this statement,
made by William A. Cave, President of
the American Anti-Vivisection Society,
summarizes the unanimous opinion of
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the entire antivivisection movement. In
point of fact, things are not that simple:
there is considerable divergence of opinion within the antivivisection movement
as to what experiments, if any, are justifiable. Not all antivivisectionists would
agree with William A. Cave's position.
It is clear, however, that Goodman's
rejection of this position rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of Peter Singer's argument. In Animal Liberation,
Singer does not claim that human and
nonhuman animals are equal, in the
sense that they are morally entitled, in
all cases, to identical treatment, nor that
their lives are of equal value. What he
claims is that they are entitled to equal
consideration of their interests. Where
there are relevant differences between
humans and animals, different treatment is justified. A difference is relevant
only if, by virtue of that difference, the
animal will suffer no evil, or at least less
evil, if treated differently. For example,
a relevant difference between sheep and
humans with respect to the question of
voting is that sheep lack the capacity to
understand the significance of voting,
and hence suffer no evil if denied the
right to vote. In this case unequal treatment is morally justified.
With respect to the question of
physical, and in many cases, psychological pain, however, there are no relevant
differences between humans and the vast
majority of nonhuman animals. Pain is
pain no matter who suffers it. To treat an
animal differently in this respect simply
because it is not human is speciesism, a
form of prejudice that is precisely parallel to racism and sexism. Goodman thinks
this parallel is insulting to blacks and
women because he mistakenly attributes
to Singer the view that all animals' lives
are of equal value, something which
Singer explicitly denies. Goodman states:

In thus equating animals with people, Singer exemplifies an ambiguous
22
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attitude toward human welfare that
imbues much of the anti-experiment
campaign.
The question as to whether human
life is of greater value than animal life is,
however, here completely irrelevant. A
chimpanzee does not suffer any less intensely from electric shock than a
woman because his life has less value.
Hence, if it is wrong to inflict pain on
human beings to relieve greater suffering
of other human beings, then it must be
equally wrong to inflict it on nonhuman
animals who are just as capable of suffering. There is no rational reason for regarding a human's physical pain as inherently worse than a chimpanzee's.
In cases where the experiment
would result in the death of the subject,
however, the value of the life is a relevant consideration. If one were forced to
choose between experimenting on a chimpanzee or on a normal human being, the
morally appropriate choice would be
the chimpanzee, since the human life in
this instance is presumably of greater
value. We are not, however, forced to
experiment on anyone, and this example
only shows that in the case of terminal
experiments it would usually be less
wrong to experiment on chimpanzees.
This does not mean that such experiments are ethically defensible. It is in
order to make this argument clear that
Singer cites the case of the retarded infant orphan. But no matter what standards
one uses, it is obvious that the I ife of
a healthy chimpanzee must be granted a
greater value than the life of a human
who is a hopelessly retarded infant orphan. In such a case, there can be no
moral justification for choosing the
chimpanzee over the orphan to serve in
the experiment. If one does so, it can only be because of the orphan's membership in the species Homo sapiens- a
morally irrelevant consideration. If, on
the other hand, one is for some reason
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unwilling to sacrifice the infant's life for
the benefit of humanity, then one should
be equally unwilling to do so with the
chimpanzee.
In short, one may well agree with
Goodman that there are significant "critical differences of mind or soul" between
(normal) humans and other animals, without concluding that infliction of pain or
death on these animals is justified for
human benefit. The basis for William A.
Cave's conclusions- that experiments
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on animals are justified only if they
benefit the animals themselves- is not
that human and animal life are identical
in value, but that it is morally wrong to
sacrifice the interests of the inferior for
the interests of the superior. "Proscribing experiments on animals" does not
mean "prescribing them for people," as
Goodman asserts. It means doing without them. This is not misanthropy; this is

justice.
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